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HAND-DELIVERED
Mary T. Noonan,
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: Petition for Rehearing in Johnson-Bowles v. Division of
Securities, Case No. 90-00558-CA
Dear Clerk of the Court:
Relative to the above, this letter is submitted to
Judges Orme, Russon, and Jackson in accordance with Rule 24(j),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled "Citation of
Supplemental Authorities."
A new case recently issued out of the federal district
court for the Southern District of New York entitled Jessup,
Josephthal & Co. v. Piguet & Cie, (S.D.N.Y., August 21, 1991)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,195 at p. 91,029, a copy of which is
attached hereto, has a direct and favorable bearing on the
Johnsons1 December 13, 1991, Petition for Rehearing.
In the Johnsons1 December 13, 1991, Petition for
Rehearing, the Johnsons point out that they cannot be held liable
for the mere purchase of non-exempt stock simply because they
were not, as a matter of law, In pari delicto with either their
immediate sellers or those previous matters giving rise (in the
first instance) to the Division's Summary Order of March 1, 1989.
See p. 6, Petition for Rehearing (citing the U.S. Supreme Court's
Pinter v. Dahl decision and Schanaveldt v. Noy-Burn, 347 P.2d
553, 554 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1959).

Mary T. Noonan, Clerk of the Court
Page Two
January 7, 1992

While the Court in its November 29, 1991, decision correctly points out that Judge Greene ruled that Johnson-Bowles
(not Mr. Johnson) knew or should have known of the
"irregularities" respecting the stock of U.S.A. Medical (175 Utah
Adv. Rep. 29 at p. 29, item 4), this is legally insufficient to
hold the Johnsons liable under an aiding and abetting or iji pari
delicto theory — the only basis upon which the final agency
action can withstand analysis.
While the attached decision is factually different, it
does unequivocally hold that negligence, imprudence, stupidity or
even recklessness (in this case, the mere making-of-a-market in
U.S.A. Medical stock) are legally insufficient to trigger in pari
delicto or aiding and abetting liability.
feased on the foregoing, including the Johnsons1 Petition
for Rehearing, no rational basis exists to uphold the Division's
final agency action.

JMCrca
Encl.
cc:

David N. Sonnenreich, Esq.
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[1196,195] Jesup, Josephthal & Co., Inc., et al. v. Piguet & Cie., et al.

United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 90 Civ. 6544 (WK). August 21,
1991. Opinion in full text.
1. Exchange Act—Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts.—A foreign bank charged with securities fraud was subject to jurisdiction in the district in which it maintained brokerage bank accounts.
Although the bank had no offices in the United States, and was not authorized to conduct business
here, by opening trading accounts it availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws.
See 1f 26,540, "Exchange Act—Insiders; Recordkeeping; Clearance & Transfer" division, Volume 4.
2. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting.—Allegations that a foreign bank
assisted a trader's price manipulation scheme by representing to a brokerage firm that it would pay
for the trader's purchase orders when it knew that he did not have the funds to cover the purchases
were sufficient to state an aiding and abetting claim. Limited discovery would be permitted as to
whether the representations were known by the bank to be false at the time they were made, and
whether the bank's knowledge of the trader's fraudulent scheme could be inferred from its own
trading activities in the stock in question.
See f 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division,
Volume 3.
3. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting—In Pari Delicto Defense.—A brokerage firm was not precluded from recovering on an aiding and abetting claim against a bank by its
own claimed imprudence and negligence which allegedly caused its financial losses. The in pari
delicto defense may be invoked only if the plaintiff has been an active, voluntary participant in the
unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit. Mere stupidity or recklessness will not trigger this
bar.
See U 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division,
Volume 3.
Opinion of KNAPP, District Judge.
By this complaint plaintiffs Jesup, Josephthal
& Co., Inc. and Securities Settlement Corporation (hereinafter "plaintiff"), registered securities broker-dealers in the state of New York,
allege, inter alia, that the defendants violated
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. On Janaury 16, 1991,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) defendant Piguet &
Cie, Banquiers (hereinafter, "Piguet") now
moves to dismiss that complaint on the ground
that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over
it. In the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
it moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the motions are denied.

principal place of business in Switzerland. Plaintiff seeks to recover as against Piguet for its
alleged involvement in a fraud perpetrated by
defendant Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik"),
whom the complaint names as the primary
wrongdoer. As discussed in greater detail infra,
Piguet's alleged participation in this fraud
arises from activities it performed in connection
with a brokerage bank account it maintains at
Morgan Guaranty Trust (hereinafter "Morgan
Guaranty") in New York City.

Rule 12(b)(2)
Because a determination that we do not have
jurisdiction over Piguet would leave us without
power to adjudicate any other matter relating to
it, we first address this question.
BACKGROUND
Piguet is a private bank organized as a partnership under the laws of Switzerland with its

In support of its contention that we lack
personal jurisdiction over it, Piguet informs us
that it does not maintain offices in the United
States and is not authorized to conduct business
here. Its sole contacts with the United States are
three brokerage bank accounts in New York: the
above described Morgan Guaranty account, and
one account each with the Philadelphia International Bank and the American Express Bank
Limited. Piguet asserts that these accounts exist
solely to facilitate international banking transactions, including stock purchase transactions,
and that it maintains these accounts primarily
as a service to its customers. Def. Mem. p.24.1
Although it does not dispute plaintiff's allegation that some of the transactions in these

1
In opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff draws our
attention to yet another account that Piguet has with a
New York brokerage house, namely the "Cowen & Co
account" which is nowhere mentioned in the complaint
Plaintiff asserts that Piguet has engaged in substantial

trading in this account Piguet contests plaintiff's description of this account as a New York account asserting that
this account was serviced by Cowen's office in Geneva,
Switzerland See Def Reply Mem p 13 Since we find that
on the facts pleaded in the complaint that we have personal

Federal Securities Law Reports

1196,195

91,026

New Court Decisions
Jesup, Josephthal & Co., Inc. v. Piguet & Cie

1465 9-18-91

accounts are performed for the bank's own
investment purposes, it contends that since the
only alleged connection which these accounts
have with the instant suit stems from activities
it performed on behalf of its client, Kutik, "it
would be unreasonable and unfair to subject [it]
to the jurisdiction of this Court." Id. We disagree.

corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State' it has clear notice that it is subject
to suit there"); see Gilbert, 82 F.R D at 725,
726 (noting that personal jurisdiction was
proper over Swiss bank whose only contact with
New York was through four accounts maintained with three New York broker-dealers,
since the cause of action sued upon arose out of
DISCUSSION
the purchases and sales of stock in New York
It is well settled that personal jurisdiction "which were not only the direct and foreseeable,
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but the intended "effects" of the bank's "acts"
extends "to the full reach permitted by the due in Switzerland). Accordingly we find that in the
process clause." Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff circumstances before us the exercise of personal
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) 718 F.Supp. 217, 227. Accord- jurisdiction over Piguet comports with tradiingly jurisdiction can be obtained over any tional notions of fair play and substantial jusdefendant who has "certain minimum contacts tice. Cf. Perez-Rubio, 718 F.Supp. at 227 ("On a
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) . ..
this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of all doubts are to be resolved in the plaintiff's
fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at favor . . . a plaintiff need make out only a prima
227-228 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash- facie case of personal jurisdiction").
ington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316). The inquiry is
Rule 12(b)(6)
necessarily fact specific. Where, as here, jurisdiction is to be asserted over a defendant who is
In support of its motion to dismiss pursuant
not present in the forum state but has caused an to 12(b)(6) Piguet makes two contentions. First
effect in the state by an act done elsewhere, due it asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead fraud
process requires that the court determine that with particularity as required by Rule 9. Secthe defendant's conduct was such that he ond, it contends that plaintiff's actions were as
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into egregious as its own, and therefore that the
court [in the forum state]" before the exercise of doctrine of pari delicto should bar plaintiff from
jurisdiction is proper. See Perez-Rubio, 718 recovering as against it. We shall address each
F.Supp. at 228 (citation omitted).
of these contentions in turn.
Despite Piguet's recitation of the dearth of
BACKGROUND
contacts it has with this forum, it is undisputed
The theory of the complaint is that defendant
that it purchases and sells stock for its clients on
a continuing basis through the above described Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik") schemed to
correspondent bank accounts. It is also undis- inflate the value of Columbia Laboratories stock
puted that the cause of action here asserted (hereinafter "Columbia") in violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
against it arises out of its alleged activities in
one of these accounts, namely the account at and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder. See 15
Morgan Guaranty. Although Piguet strenuously U.S.C. §78j; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. In particuargues that its activities with respect to the lar, the complaint alleges that Kutik placed buy
Morgan account here complained of were per- orders for Columbia stock with various brokerformed on behalf of its client, and not itself, we age houses with no intention of actually paying
find this fact to be of little relevance for by for the ordered shares. Plaintiff contends that
offering the services provided by these accounts Kutik's motivation for this fraud stems from the
to its clients, Piguet acts to inure to its own fact that he had secured substantial loans using
benefit. See Securities Exchange Commission v. Columbia shares as collateral, and that, accordGilbert (1979) 82 F.R.D. 723, 725. By opening ing to the terms of these loan agreements, he
these accounts Piguet purposely chose to would be obligated to put up additional collat"[avail] itself of the privilege of conducting eral as security should the value of Columbia
activities within the forum State, thus invoking stock decline to below $9.00 a share.
the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson
The gravamen of the claim against Piguet is
v. Denckla (1957) 357 U.S. 235, 253. Thus, it is that Piguet aided and abetted Kutik's scheme to
only reasonable to conclude that Piguet must manipulate the price of Columbia stock. The
"anticipate being haled into court" in New York relevant facts of this claim are as follows.
for alleged illegal conduct it performed through
these accounts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 3,
v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ("When a 1990, it was contacted by Kutik to open an
(Footnote Continued)
jurisdiction over Piguet we need not presently address the
merits of this dispute.

1196,195
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account on behalf of Dermar Panama, SA (hereinafter, the "Dermar" account) 2 . Kutik
informed plaintiff that he had authority to open
this account and to direct trading activities
therein on Dermar's behalf. In the following
week, acting under Kutik's instructions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 80,500 shares of
Columbia common stock for the Dermar
account. Although Kutik represented that payment for said purchases would be prompt, no
such payments were ever made. Compl. 1f 96.
On August 14, at Kutik's request, plaintiff
opened a second account, entitled the Farnell
Holdings, Ltd. account (hereinafter the "Farnell" account)3. Pursuant to Kutik's instructions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 88,300
shares of Columbia common stock for this
account over the next week.
After plaintiff made repeated demands for
payment for the Dermar purchases, Kutik
informed it that payment could be facilitated if
it would transfer the stock which it had purchased for the Dermar account to a new account
entitled the "Dermar Morgan" account and designate Morgan Guaranty as the receiving agent
for stock purchased for this new account. Kutik
explained that his bank, Piguet, had an account
at Morgan Guaranty, and that it would furnish
the funds necessary to pay for the stock on a
delivery versus payment basis. He assured
plaintiff that at all times there would be sufficient funds on deposit with Morgan Guaranty to
pay for all transactions effected for this account.
See id. atfl102.
Pursuant to this information, and at Kutik's
instruction, plaintiff contacted Piguet and was
informed that "both Kutik and Dermar were
clients of Piguet and that arrangements were
being made to make payment for the 80,500
shares of Columbia stock which [would be]
transferred to the Dermar Morgan account." 4
Id. at U 107. Accordingly, on August 21, 1990,
plaintiff opened the Dermar Morgan account.
Between August 21 and August 27, plaintiff
attempted to deliver to Morgan Guaranty the
80,500 shares of Columbia stock now purchased
on behalf of the Dermar Morgan account. Morgan Guaranty, however, refused such delivery.

Id. at H i l l , 112.

Again pursuant to Kutik's instructions, on
August 29, plaintiff opened a separate account
entitled the "Farnell Morgan" account, desig2
Dermar, a defendant in this action, is a Panama corporation with its principal place of business in Switzerland
3
Farnell, also a defendant, is a United Kingdom corporation with its principal place of business in Gibraltar
4
Paragraph 107 of the complaint states that "(Piguet]
telephoned [plaintiff] prior to August 21, 1990, and confirmed that both Kutik and Dermar were clients of Piguet
and that arrangements were being made to make payment
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nated Morgan Guaranty the receiving agent for
this account, and transferred to it the stock
previously purchased for the Farnell account.
The complaint alleges that to confirm that payment arrangements were being made for this
transferred stock, plaintiff again contacted
Piguet, and was informed that Piguet would
make immediate payment for "all of the Columbia shares purchased for the various accounts
maintained by Kutik . . . upon delivery of such
securities to Morgan [Guaranty]." Id. at
H 126, 127.
At or about this time plaintiff, acting on
Kutik's instructions, purchased an additional
66,000 shares of Columbia stock for the Farnell
Morgan account and transferred all stock then
in the Dermar Morgan account to this Farnell
Morgan account. Accordingly, by September 1
plaintiff had purchased a total of 234,800 shares
of Columbia stock for Kutik, all of which were
held in the Farnell Morgan account.
On several occasions between August 29 and
September 7 plaintiff attempted to deliver the
234,800 shares to Morgan Guaranty. However,
Morgan Guaranty continued to refuse receipt of
this stock. Id. at jf 132.
The complaint alleges that thereafter Piguet
was advised that the 234,800 shares presently
held in the Farnell Morgan account would be
resold due to nonpayment. In response, on September 7 Piguet represented to plaintiff that:
[it] was in the process of making arrangements for the payment for all of the full
purchase price for all 234,000 [234,000]
[shares] of Columbia stock held in the Farnell
Morgan brokerage account, and that the previous delays preventing Morgan [Guaranty]
from accepting delivery of said securities and
tendering payment for same was due to
problems encountered in transmitting the
appropriate instructions to Morgan [Guaranty] for the conversion of Swiss Francs into
U.S. Dollars for payment to [plaintiff] for the
Columbia shares.
Id. at 1J133.
On September 10, Piguet did in fact forward
to plaintiff $922,075.58 to pay for 100,000 of
the 234,800 Columbia shares. Plaintiff alleges
that in light of the September 7 conversation
with Piguet it justifiably relied upon the fact
that this was a partial payment and accordingly
for the 80,500 shares of Columbia stock, which had been
transferred to the Dermar Morgan Account, in cash, or by
delivery of other negotiable securities, to Morgan
" Since
the complaint informs that the Dermar Morgan account
was not opened until plaintiff had received this information
we presume the language cited above was intended to be set
forth in conditional terms

1196,195
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did not liquidate the remaining 134,800 shares.
Id. at H 191. Thereafter, on September 19, 20,
and 21, plaintiff's registered representative Jeffrey Leach introduced Kutik to other brokerdealers, with whom Kutik proceeded to place
purchase orders for an additional 56,000 snares
of Columbia stock. Piguet made no additional
payments to plaintiff, and in the period of September 20 to December 6 plaintiff sold the
remaining stock for $684,743. Plaintiff asserts
that it suffered a loss of $509,958 on this transaction.5
In support of its claim that Piguet aided and
abetted Kutik's alleged illegal conduct, the complaint specifically pleads "upon information and
belief" that Piguet knew of the existence and
purpose of Kutik's scheme to violate the securities laws, and that it rendered substantial assistance to this scheme. See id. at H 188, 190. The
complaint asserts that Piguet's knowledge of the
underlying securities fraud perpetrated by
Kutik can be inferred from the fact that Piguet,
as Kutik's bank, "[knew] of Kutik's financial
resources and concomitant inability to make
payment" for the amount of shares he ordered.
See id. at \ 189. The complaint does not, however, specifically state that at the time Piguet
represented to plaintiff that it would pay for all
shares, see id. at f 133, it knew that it's client
would not be forwarding to it funds necessary to
pay for said shares; nor does it allege that when
Piguet asserted that it had had difficulty transferring Swiss francs into U.S. currency, see id., it
knew this statement to be false.
,' In its brief in opposition plaintiff offers an
additional fact from which Piguet's knowledge
of the alleged securities fraud might be inferred,
namely that it itself owned a substantial number of shares of Columbia stock in August 1990,
and that it engaged in substantial trading activity in this stock during the period of Kutik's
alleged fraudulent scheme. See PI. Mem. at 20
n.2; supra at 2, n.l. Plaintiff concedes, however,
that this information is not pleaded in its complaint.
DISCUSSION
Rule 9
To state a claim for aider and abettor liability
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate: (1) the existence
of a securities law violation by the primary
party; (2) knowledge of the violation by the
5
$509,958 represents the difference between the price
plaintiff originally paid for the shares namely 2,116,777 and
the price it received from this delayed sale.
6
For purposes of this motion, Piguet assumes that the
allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to
allege securities laws violations by Kutik. See Def Mem at
14 n 7.
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aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance
by the aider and abettor in achievement of the
primary violation. Armstrong v. McAlpin (2d
Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 79, 91. In support of this
motion to dismiss, Piguet contends that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to properly plead factors (2) and (3).6
With respect to factor (3) Piguet contends
that as a matter of law its three conversations
with plaintiff do not constitute "substantial
assistance". Def. Mem at 20. We disagree. The
success of Kutik's alleged scheme artificially to
inflate the price of Columbia stock was dependent on his ability to induce plaintiff to
purchase shares on his behalf, over a period of
time. We can not say as a matter of law that no
reasonable juror could conclude that Piguet's
affirmative statement to plaintiff that it would
pay for all shares ordered by Kutik did not
substantially assist Kutik in this task. Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether or not
plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish
that Piguet knew that Kutik was engaged in a
scheme to violate the securities laws.
Citing Rule 9 7, Piguet contends that even if
we were to assume that it knew that its client
Kutik did not have the funds at hand to pay for
the stock he was instructing plaintiff to
purchase, it by no means follows that it would
have known—or even should necessarily have
suspected—that Kutik was entering orders
which he did not hope to be able to cover.
Rather, it contends that it is only logical to infer
that it assumed Kutik would in due course provide the necessary funds for his purchases. In
support of this argument, Piguet draws our
attention to the absence of any allegation by
plaintiff that any statements it made to plaintiff were "knowinglv false" when made. See
5/30/91 Tr. at 24.
At first glance we found these arguments persuasive. However, at oral argument plaintiff
informed us that it did not affirmatively plead
that Piguet made false statements precisely
because the information necessary to plead such
an allegation is exclusively within Piguet's possession. In particular, plaintiff argued that
whether or not Piguet had in fact had difficulty
transferring Swiss francs to U.S. dollars, or had
made any efforts whatsoever prior to September
10 to pay for any of the stock ordered by Kutik,
were facts known only to Piguet and could be
substantiated only through discovery. See id. at
23-28.
Rule 9 provides:

In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other conditions of a
mind of a person may be averred generally.

©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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Although Rule 9 requires that allegations of
fraud be pleaded with particularity, it specifically provides that "[mjalice, intent, knowledge,
or other conditions of a mind of a person may be
averred generally , \ In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex
Hospital Trustees (1975) 425 U.S. 738, 746, the
Supreme Court observed that:
'[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) . . . And in . . .
cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators/ Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962),
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample
opportunity for discovery should be granted
very sparingly.
Having reviewed all of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the briefs submitted in
relation to the instant motions, we can not say
that plaintiff can not prove any set of facts in
support of its claim that Piguet knew of Kutik's
scheme to violate the securities laws and,
accordingly, that it aided and abetted him in
this task. Cf. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane (2d Cir.
1990) 897 F.2d 75, 80-81 (" [p]lausible allegations that defendants made specific promises to
induce a securities transaction while secretly
intending not to carry them out or knowing they
could not be carried out, and that they were not
carried out, are sufficient... to state a claim for
relief under Section 10(b)' " (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, pursuant to the teaching of Hospital Bldg. Co., we presently deny Piguet's motion
to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity, and grant plaintiff limited discovery on
the following two issues: (1) whether or not
statements which Piguet made to plaintiff during any of the three above discussed conversations were known by Piguet to be false at the
time they were made, and (2) whether—or to
what extent—Piguet's knowledge of Kutik's
fraudulent scheme can be inferred from its own
trading activities in the shares of Columbia
stock it owned. Piguet may, of course, renew this
motion to dismiss at the close of discovery on
these issues. Pfaintiff, if so advised, may in the
interim file a second amended complaint.
In pari delicto
As an alternative ground for dismissing the
complaint, Piguet asserts that even if the plaintiff could allege a valid aiding and abetting
claim, the doctrine of in pari delicto should
preclude it from recovering on this claim
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because it was plaintiffs own imprudence and
negligence which caused it to suffer the financial loss here asserted. See 5/30/91 Tr. at 28. In
support of this claim, Piguet cites the facts that
plaintiff, a sophisticated broker-dealer, proceeded to permit Kutik to order an aggregate of
234,800 shares of Columbia stock over a period
of less than six weeks without ever having paid
one cent for said purchases, and it even "aided"
Kutik in his purchase of an additional 56,000
Columbia shares by introducing him to other
broker-dealers even though it, itself, had never
been paid for any of the stock Kutik ordered
purchased.
The common law defense of in pari delicto
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering only if he
"is as guilty of wrongdoing as the party he
accuses." Ross v. Bolton, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 639
F.Supp. 323, 328 citing MaJlis v. Bankers Trust,
(2d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 68, 76 cert, denied,
(1981) 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 938, 67
L.Ed.2d 109. Mere stupidity, or even recklessness, will not suffice to trigger this bar. As the
Court in Pinter v. Dahl (1988) 486 U.S. 622,
636 stated:
The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary
participant in the unlawful activity that is
the subject of the suit. 'Plaintiffs who are
truly in pari delicto are those who have themselves violated the law in cooperation with the
defendant'. Unless the degrees of fault are
essentially indistinguishable or the plaintiff's
responsibility is clearly greater, the in pari
delicto defense should not be allowed, and the
plaintiff should be compensated, (citations
omitted).
On the facts presently before us, we can not
conclude that this affirmative defense will inevitably bar plaintiff from recovering against
Piguet. Piguet does not claim that plaintiff
knew of Kutik's fraudulent scheme nor does it
assert that plaintiffs actions to accommodate
Kutik's requests to purchase stock were in any
way unlawful. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
CONCLUSION
Piguet's motions to dismiss are denied. It is
granted leave to renew that portion of its Rule
12(b)(6) motion specified above after discovery
on the issues outlined is completed or after a
reasonable period of time has passed. Plaintiff is
granted leave to file a second amended complaint, if it be so advised.
SO ORDERED.
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